The investment case
Mako Mining mines gold from a high-grade open-pit deposit in northern Nicaragua and sells it at prevailing spot prices. The San Albino mine in Nueva Segovia mills ore at 7-9 grams per tonne, confirmed by an NI 43-101 Mineral Resource Estimate at 11.61 g/t on a fully-diluted open-pit basis, materially above the typical open-pit industry benchmark. Grade is where the economics live in this business: higher-grade feed reduces the cost allocation per recovered ounce at a given throughput rate and it shows directly in the unit economics.
The balance sheet transformation is the most underappreciated fact about this company. In early 2022, Mako carried a working-capital deficit and meaningful obligations to two creditors. By December 31, 2025, it held US$78M in combined cash and receivables with zero long-term debt. The mechanism matters. The clean balance sheet came from a documented sequence of operational decisions, prioritizing cash generation over production growth, repaying debt from operations and structuring three acquisitions to minimize both cash outlay and equity dilution. A commodity price spike played no part in building it. FY2025 free cash flow was approximately US$21M in the first nine months alone.
Since San Albino reached commercial production in July 2021, Mako has added three development assets: the Moss Mine in Arizona (acquired for US$6.5M out of bankruptcy, 646,000 M&I ounces at 0.35 g/t), Mt. Hamilton in Nevada (fully permitted, shovel-ready, acquired via a royalty stream with zero cash and zero dilution), and Eagle Mountain in Guyana (1.2M indicated ounces at 1.18 g/t, acquired entirely in stock). Management's informal target is 200,000 oz/year by H1 2028 across four operating mines. At US$4,500/oz gold, the SOTP-implied equity value is approximately C$15.84 per share against a current price of C$9.85.
The earnings quality is real. From FY2022 through 9M 2025, operating cash flow exceeded reported net income in every period. In FY2024, US$19.2M net income against US$34.4M of operating cash flow. TTM Adjusted EBITDA through September 30, 2025 was US$60.8M, yielding an EV/EBITDA of ~9.1× on an enterprise value of US$555.6M. Q4 2025 was a record quarter: US$50M of revenue in a single quarter at US$4,313/oz average gold. That quarter is not yet reflected in the trailing multiple.
The stock trades at a moderate multiple, and the report says so openly. The opportunity lies in the gap between what the market is currently modeling, a single Nicaraguan mine at a stable gold price, and what may be in place by 2028, a four-asset platform approaching 200,000 ounces while gold trades above US$4,500/oz. Any re-rating would need more than multiple expansion and would come from the market slowly correcting an error it has not yet revisited.
Why the mispricing persists
- Nicaragua jurisdiction: institutional processes stop at the word. The full analysis is more nuanced, gold represents ~35% of Nicaragua's total export earnings, and Mako has operated through four years of commercial production without a single material disruption to its operating license.
- Junior gold label: the category implies perpetual dilution and leveraged balance sheets. Mako's actual trajectory is the opposite: debt repaid, shares bought back, three acquisitions structured to minimize dilution. The label does not match the balance sheet.
- No analyst coverage: no institutional sponsorship, no algorithm flags it. Prices that are wrong tend to stay wrong, in both directions, until something forces a recalibration.
